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Many of us will be familiar with the Kantian imperative that we must act only on that 
maxim through which we can at the same time will that it should become a universal 
law. And many of us will be equally familiar with Kant’s related proposition that 
people are ends in and of themselves and should not be treated solely as a means to an 
end. As it is Kant’s proposition, I will allow him to state it: 
 
[M]an, and in general every rational being exists as an end in 
himself and not merely as a means for arbitrary use by this or that 
will: he must in all his actions, whether they are directed to himself 
or to other rational beings, always be viewed at the same time as an 
end.3 
 
Relying on rationality and moral agency, Kant separated out humans from other 
things and posited that they deserve special treatment: 
 
Beings whose existence depends, not on our will, but on nature, have 
nonetheless, if they are not rational beings, only a relative value as 
means and are consequently called things. Rational beings, on the 
other hand, are called persons because their nature already marks 
them out as ends in themselves – that is, as something which ought 
not to be used merely as a means – and consequently imposes to that 
extent a limit on all arbitrary treatment of them (and is an object of 
reverence).4 
 
In essence, to treat someone solely as a “means” is to inappropriately 
“instrumentalise” that person, and to so instrumentalise someone is to act immorally 
(toward them). 
 
Although the above notions, founded on the belief that humans have and deserve 
dignity, are the foundation of, and find a voice in, many modern human rights 
instruments,5 they are just as often observed in the breach as in the realisation. And 
this is what troubles and thereby moves Magnani to explore the theory he offers in 
Morality in a Technological World; this and an increasingly dehumanised social 
setting which he describes as having a “ubiquitous technological presence” and 
through which human behaviour (and the human-generated technosphere) can have a 
tremendous impact on the world (pp.xiii and 8). By way of example, he cites 
overpopulation, commercial/industrial/chemical undertakings, biotechnology 
innovations, and their consequences, which include ozone depletion, noxious gas 
production, biodiversity destruction and genetic mutation. He claims that this modern 
techno-culture raises unique moral issues (from ecological rescue, to biotech safety, to 
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human hybridisation, to cyberprivacy) and duties (the ultimate one being to respect 
human dignity). 
 
However, Magnani doesn’t just offer a further contribution to the philosophical 
discourse on dignity, rationality, instrumentality and the concomitant moral duty to 
enhance the respect that is shown to people (and thereby improve the lot of people 
around the world who truly need assistance). Rather, he turns this discourse on its 
head. Citing the wildlife preservation context as an example, he says: 
 
[T]here is a continuous delegation of moral values to externalities; 
this may […] cause some people to complain that wildlife [for 
example] receives greater moral and legal protection than, for 
example, disappearing cultural traditions. I wondered what 
reasoning process would result in a nonhuman thing’s being valued 
over a living, breathing person and asked […] what might be done 
to elevate the status of human beings. One solution […] is to re-
examine the respect we have developed for particular externalities 
and then to use those things as a vehicle to return value to people. 
(p.x) 
 
In short, Magnani offers the radical suggestion that human beings can and should be 
treated as “things” (a traditionally disparaged proposition), and can thus come to be 
respected as things that have, in the modern world, been ascribed more value than 
(some) people. By doing so, he claims that we can “re-appropriate” the moral esteem 
that we have “lavished” on external things/objects such as endangered species, works 
of art, information and information systems. An integral element of this approach, he 
says, is to recognise that our modern techno- and knowledge-based world imposes on 
us a duty to produce and apply ethical knowledge in keeping with scientific 
knowledge. In short, (scientific) knowledge imposes on us duties, not only to produce 
more knowledge, but also to use it to effect positive change in the world, and that 
means improving the lives of humans who suffer. 
 
To the above end, Magnani begins in chapter 1 by exploring the idea that humans and 
nonhuman things are co-dependent, and people can and should be respected as 
“things” of value. As the basis of his argument, he claims that people are information- 
and knowledge-carriers and might be valued as such, saying: 
 
Human beings are no less important than the nonhuman artefacts to 
which they […] are so closely related. Because we already respect 
nonhuman artefactual repositories of knowledge – libraries, medical 
machines like PETs and MRIs, computers, databases, and so on – it 
should be easy to learn to respect human ones; we need only expand 
our idea of “knowledge carrier” to include people […] The 
widespread hybridisation of our era makes it necessary – but also 
easy – “to respect people as things”. (p.28) 
 
Moreover, he argues that humans are deeply integrated with these information 
artefacts (and other nonhuman objects). Humans and nonhumans are “folded into” 
one another insofar as we delegate action to external things (objects, tools, artefacts) 
that thereby share our human existence with us; we experience “an exchange of 
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human and nonhuman properties” which causes a “mixing up of objectivity and 
subjectivity”. Given that this state is the hallmark of the modern “civilised life”, the 
characterisation of “people as means” is all the more appropriate and helpful. 
 
In chapter 2, drawing on scholars like Baker,6 Beauchamp,7 Harris,8 and Steinbock,9 
Magnani explores some of the moral issues and arguments surrounding reproductive 
technologies (particularly in vitro fertilisation) as well as various other (soon-to-exist) 
medical technologies (reproductive cloning, cortical micro-electrodes, and so on), 
many of which evince at least a tacit acceptance of organic and inorganic marriages 
for curative purposes. In rehearsing these arguments and technological possibilities, 
Magnani seeks to demonstrate that humans are increasingly integrated with nonhuman 
artefacts and technical processes, and are therefore deserving of a new understanding 
(p.42, note 4). His overall purpose is to demonstrate that it is moral to recognise 
people – who are increasingly human-artefact hybrids – as “things”. Indeed, given the 
pace and direction of technology, there is an increasingly urgent need for people to be 
“respected as things”. 
 
Chapter 3 commences from the proposition that knowledge, in the technological age, 
has become a much more profoundly important duty than ever before because of the 
profound consequences it can have on our wellbeing and dignity (p.65). Scientific 
knowledge allows us to better understand the external events of nature (and to develop 
artefacts that serve us within that environment), and moral knowledge helps us to 
better anticipate what artefacts might jeopardise our dignity. As such, we must be 
committed to knowledge-generation, for knowledge shapes how and what we think, 
makes possible intentionality and free will, heightens consciousness and makes 
possible the realisation of dignity (p.91). 
 
In chapter 4, Magnani makes the case for knowledge-generation and -dissemination as 
a means of encouraging creative, model-based, manipulative ethical thinking, 
particularly around “moral mediators” (which are generally the artefacts to which we 
give value and choose to use as value-comparators or value-transferors on behalf of 
people) (pp.93-118). However, he cautions that judgments must be made about the 
quality and type of information considered morally valuable, and to that end, he 
explores some of the moral issues that are implicated by our informational capabilities 
in the “Cyber Age”. He states that information technologies are increasingly 
ubiquitous, are compounding our hybridisation, and are threatening human dignity in 
more insidious ways (than the reproductive technologies discussed in chapter 2). 
Though greatly valued, they can be immoral through their erosion of privacy, which is 
fundamental to human freedom and intimacy (and therefore dignity). If dignity is to 
flourish in this new, informational environment, we must interrogate some of the 
internal conditions which erode it. 
 
Thus, chapter 5 explores our personal relationship with knowledge and the part that 
relationship plays in determining the level of freedom we enjoy. It is premised on the 
belief that people frequently deny the fact that choice exists; they create a simple 
world in which there are no alternatives so as to shield themselves from the 
responsibility and anxiety of difficult decision-making – they self-delude and thereby 
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commit “bad faith” insofar as decisions are externalised and limited (p.129). As a 
result, they artificially reduce their own freedom and that of others who are affected 
by their actions (or inactions). Magnani concludes that living without important 
information – whether we have resisted it or are unaware of it – is to create a “toxic 
state of ignorance” which feeds “bad faith” and leads to poor decisions and a 
corrosion of wellbeing (p.160). 
 
In the final two chapters of the book, Magnani shifts focus, offering the 
methodological foundation associated with the moral reasoning/deliberation he is 
espousing. In chapter 6, he contends that morality is the effort to guide one’s conduct 
by reasons (ie, to do what there are the best reasons for doing while giving weight to 
the interests of individuals affected by the conduct). As such, we need to develop 
sound principles for choosing actions and appropriate ways of reasoning that permit 
us to apply them so as to facilitate “moral coherence”, which, in turn, helps us to 
explore the multidimensional character of ethical problems. To that end, he suggests 
“manipulative abduction” (ie, discovering new ideas and theories by manipulating 
external objects and representations as is done in the scientific realm), or moral 
thinking through doing (pp.184-197). In chapter 7, Magnani challenges casuistry and 
attempts to illustrate that “abduction” (ie, reasoning to hypotheses) is central to ethical 
deliberation insofar as it demonstrates that judgments, especially those in complicated 
scenarios, do not always derive from rigid, well-established principles, but often from 
verbal argument that takes into account particular circumstances, precedents and 
exceptions. This, of course, is particularly the case in techno-settings where advances 
create unanticipated challenges (pp.215-240). 
 
Ultimately, Magnani’s theory can be characterised as a “combination of ethics, 
epistemology, and cognitive science”, and he sums up by stating: 
 
I am convinced that moral concerns involve reasoning that bears 
important parallels to reasoning in the sciences and that these 
similarities can help us to address the problem of moral deliberation 
in cases and problems not anticipated by moral philosophers (p.248) 
 
In applying that reasoning, he relies on “moral mediators”, which are “entities we can 
construct in order to bring about certain ethical effects [and which] may exist as 
beings, objects or structures” (p.248). 
 
On the claim that our modern (techno) capabilities impose greater efforts of foresight 
(and the generation of information to facilitate that foresight) than ever before, I fully 
agree with Magnani, who says: 
 
As the global stakes grow higher, knowledge becomes a more 
critically important duty than ever before and must be used to inform 
new ethics and new behaviors in both public policy and private 
conduct […] [E]thical behaviour requires that we assume long-
range responsibility commensurate with the scope of our power to 
affect the planet (p.95) 
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Additionally, I can appreciate the desire to find new ways to integrate morality and 
the modern world (ie, to increase the effectiveness of morality in modern contexts). 
And though I’m not convinced that existing ethical theories are not up to the task of 
evaluating behaviour and pointing it in the “proper” direction,10 the exploration of a 
theory specifically tailored for the new techno-setting is valuable. As such, I believe 
this is a useful contribution to the techno-moral discourse and to scholarship more 
generally. 
 
As I worked my way through Magnani’s treatise, I was baffled, delighted, bemused, 
and enlightened in turns, and, as a consequence, I am the better for it. But this was no 
easy journey, and Magnani’s assurance that his approach “allow[s] us to reorient and 
modernize philosophical discussions […] in a way that avoids the formal treatments 
of traditional moral philosophy,” (p.248, note 4) did not, as it turns out, mean that his 
theory was any more comprehensible (to the non-philosopher) than any of his 
antecedents. In short, I believe that Morality in a Technological World suffers 
spectacularly from an accessibility standpoint. I found it dense and demanding, and 
though this may be the fault of the reviewer’s mind rather than the theory or the prose, 
I feel safe in saying that this book is not for everyone.11 
 
Ultimately, I’m not at all convinced that I “got it”,12 and my struggles were 
compounded by the structure of the book/argument; it did not, in my opinion, flow 
from one topic to the next, building the argument as it went. For example: 
 
1. Given that it was continually referred to throughout, I would have preferred to see 
the methodological content (chapters 6 and 7) at the outset, followed by (chapter 1) 
arguments about the importance of knowledge, (chapter 2) defences of knowledge as 
duty, and (chapter 3) explorations and defences of the new way of treating/ 
conceptualising people within the moral evaluative process. 
 
2. The concept of humans as “knowledge carriers” or “repositories” is briefly 
introduced and relied on in chapter 1, re-introduced in chapter 4, and further explored 
in chapter 5, but done so in such a way as to give the impression of several temporally 
distinct works pieced together. I would have preferred it to be fully described and 
defended at the outset (ie, in the first chapter after the methodological treatment) so 
that one has a firm grasp of what is meant and its potential implications. 
 
This structural problem may be a function of the book trying to serve multiple ends 
(eg, to offer and defend a science-based methodology, to explore “knowledge as 
duty”, to reverse thinking about “humans as things/means”), but structuring it in 
accordance with those ends would have helped. 
 
Having said that, the broad message contained in this book – that our burgeoning 
knowledge imposes on us multiplying duties and the need to be absolutely vigilant 
about meeting them – is something that can and should be embraced by all. Although 
the idea of “duties” may not resonate universally, the limitations of “rights talk” is 
starkly exposed in the plight of millions, so a discourse reliant on duties is both 
helpful and welcome. Finally, and also importantly, Magnani rightly reminds us that 
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we are not entitled to forget or ignore the global-scale consequences of our localised 
actions, nor to reduce our moral obligations simply because they are embedded in 
complex systems (whether commercial, political or social) (pp.98-103). As such, I 
congratulate Magnani on his attempt to promote knowledge and duty (and knowledge 
as duty) and to contemporise certain elements of moral thinking. 
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